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Abstract—There have been several approaches to provisioning
traffic between core network nodes in Internet Service Provider
(ISP) networks. Such approaches aim to minimize network delay,
increase network capacity, and enhance network security ser-
vices. MATE (Multipath Adaptive Traffic Engineering) protocol
has been proposed for multipath adaptive traffic engineering be-
tween an ingress node (source) and an egress node (destination).
Its novel idea is to avoid network congestion and attacks that
might exist in edge and node disjoint paths between two core
network nodes.
This paper builds an adaptive, robust, and reliable traffic
engineering scheme for better performance of communication
network operations. This will also provision quality of service
(QoS) and protection of traffic engineering to maximize network
efficiency. Specifically, we present a new approach, S-MATE
(secure MATE) is developed to protect the network traffic
between two core nodes (routers or switches) in a cloud network.
S-MATE secures against a single link attack/failure by adding
redundancy in one of the operational paths between the sender
and receiver. The proposed scheme can be built to secure core
networks such as optical and IP networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been several proposals to adapt the traffic
between core network nodes in Internet Service Provider
(ISP) networks [7], [12], [14]. Elwalid et al. [7] proposed an
algorithm for multipath adaptive traffic engineering between
an ingress node (source) and an egress node (destination) in a
communication network. Their novel idea is to avoid network
congestion that might exist in disjoint paths between two core
network nodes. They suggested load balancing among paths
based on measurement and analysis of path congestion by
using Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS). MPLS is an
emerging tool for facilitating traffic engineering unlike explicit
routing protocols that allow certain routing methodology from
hop-to-hop in a network with multiple core devices. The major
advantage of MATE is that it does not require scheduling,
buffer management, or traffic priority in the nodes.
Network coding is a powerful tool that has been recently
used to increase the throughput, capacity, and performance
of wired and wireless communication networks. Information
theoretic aspects of network coding have been investigated in
several research papers, see for example [1], [10], [18], and the
list of references therein. It offers benefits in terms of energy
efficiency, additional security, and reduced delay. Network
coding allows the intermediate nodes not only to forward
packets using network scheduling algorithms, but also to en-
Fig. 1. The network model is represented by two network nodes, an ingress
node (source) and an egress node (receiver). There are k link disjoint paths
between the ingress and egress nodes.
code/decode them through algebraic primitive operations [1],
[9], [10], [18]. For example, data loss because of failures in
communication links can be detected and recovered if the
sources are allowed to perform network coding operations [5],
[11], [13].
MATE, which was previously proposed by one of the
authors of this paper, is a traffic load balancing scheme that
is suitable for S-MATE (secure MATE) as will be explained
later. MATE distributes traffic among the edge disjoint paths,
so as to equalize the path delays. This is achieved by using
adaptive algorithms. MATE inspired other traffic engineering
solutions such as TexCP [14] and the measurement-based
optimal routing solution [17]. In this paper, we will design a
security scheme by using network coding to protect against an
entity who cannot only copy/listen to the message, but can also
fabricate new messages or modify the current ones. We aim to
build an adaptive, robust, reliable traffic engineering scheme
for better performance and operation of communication net-
works. The scheme will also provide provisioning quality of
service (QoS) and protection of traffic engineering.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the network model and assumptions. In Sections III
and IV, we review the MATE scheme and propose a secure
MATE scheme based on network coding. Section VI provides
network protection using distributed capacities and QOS, and
finally Section VII concludes the paper.
2II. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
The network model can be represented as follows. Assume
a given network represented by a set of nodes and links. The
network nodes are core nodes that transmit outgoing packets
to the neighboring nodes in certain time slots. The network
nodes are ingress and egress nodes that share multiple edge
and node disjoint paths.
We assume that the core nodes share k edge disjoint paths,
as shown in Fig. 1, for one particular pair of ingress and egress
nodes. Let N = {N1, N2, ...} be the set of nodes (ingress and
egress) and let L = {L1ℓh, L2ℓh, ..., Lkℓh} be the set of paths
from ingress node Nℓ to an egress node Nh. Every path Liℓh
carries segments of independent packets from ingress node
Nℓ to egress node Nh. Let P ijℓh be the packet sent from the
ingress node Nℓ in path i at time slot j to the egress Nh. For
simplicity, we describe our scheme for one particular pair of
ingress and egress nodes. Hence, we use P ij to represent a
packet in path i at time slot j.
Assume there are δ rounds (time slots) in a transmission
session. For the remaining paper, rounds and time slots will
be used interchangeably . Packet P ij is indexed as follows:
Packet
ij
ℓh(IDNℓ , X
ij, roundj), (1)
where IDNℓ and X ij are, respectively, the sender ID and
transmitted data from Nℓ in the path Li at time slot j. There
are two types of packets: plain and encoded packets. A plain
packet contains the unencoded data from the ingress to egress
nodes as shown in Equation (1). An encoded packet contains
encoded data from different incoming packets. For example,
if there are k incoming packets to the ingress node Nl, then
the encoded data traversed in the protection path Lilh to the
egress node Nh are given by
yj =
k∑
i=1,j 6=i
P
ij
lh , (2)
where the summation denotes the binary addition. The corre-
sponding packet becomes
Packet
ij
ℓh(IDNℓ , y
j , roundj). (3)
The following definition describes the working and protec-
tion paths between two network switches as shown in Fig. 1.
Definition 1: The working paths in a network with k con-
nection paths carry un-encoded (plain) traffic under normal
operations. The protection paths provide alternate backup
paths to carry encoded traffic. A protection scheme ensures
that data sent from the sources will reach the receivers in case
of attack/failure incidences in the working paths.
We make the following assumptions about the transmission
of the plain and encoded packets.
i) The TCP protocol will handle the transmission and packet
headers in the edge disjoint paths from ingress to egress
nodes.
ii) The data from the ingress nodes are sent in rounds and
sessions throughout the edge disjoint paths to the egress
Fig. 2. MATE traffic engineering at the ingress node.
nodes. Each session is quantified by the number of rounds
(time slots) n. Hence, tδj is the transmission time at the
time slot j in session δ.
iii) The attacks and failures on a path Li may be incurred
by a network incident such as an eavesdropper, link
replacement, and overhead. We assume that the receiver is
able to detect a failure (attacked link), and our protection
strategy described in S-MATE is able to recover it.
iv) We assume that the ingress and egress nodes share a set
of k symmetric keys. Furthermore, the plain and encoded
data are encrypted by using this set of keys. That is
xi = Encyptkeyi(m
i),
where mi is the message encrypted by the keyi. Sharing
symmetric keys between two entities (two core network
nodes) can be achieved by using key establishment pro-
tocols described in [15], [16].
v) In this network model, we consider only a single link
failure or attack; it is thus sufficient to apply the encoding
and decoding operations over a finite field with two
elements, denoted as F2 = {0, 1}.
The traffic from the ingress node to the egress node in edge
disjoint paths can be exposed to edge failures and network
attacks. Hence, it is desirable to protect and secure this traffic.
We assume that there is a set of k connection paths that need to
be fully guaranteed and protected against a single edge failure
from ingress to egress nodes. We assume that all connections
have the same bandwidth, and each link (one hop or circuit)
has the same bandwidth as the path.
III. MATE PROTOCOL
MPLS (Multipath Protocol Label Switching) is an emerging
tool for facilitating traffic engineering and out-of-band control.
unlike explicit routing protocols, which allow certain routing
methodology from hop-to-hop in a network with multiple core
devices. As shown in Fig. 2, MATE assumes that several
explicit paths between an ingress node and an egress node
in a cloud network have been established. This is a typical
setting which exists in operational Internet Service Provider
(ISP) core networks (which implement MPLS). The goal of
3the ingress node is to distribute traffic across the edge disjoint
paths, so that the loads are balanced. One advantage of this
load balancing is to equalize path delays, and to minimize
traffic congestion [7], [8].
The following are the key features of the MATE algorithm.
1) The traffic is distributed at the granularity of the IP flow
level. This ensures that packets from the same flow follow
the same path, and hence there is no need for packet re-
sequencing at the destination. This is easily and effectively
achieved by using a hashing function on the five tuple IP
address.
2) MATE is a traffic load balancing scheme, which is suitable
for S-MATE, as will be explained later. MATE distributes
traffic among the edge disjoint paths, so as to equalize the
path delays. This is achieved by using adaptive algorithms
as shown in Fig. 2 and Reference [7]
3) It is shown that distributed load balancing (for each ingress
egress pair) is stable and provably convergent. MATE
assumes that several network nodes exist between ingress
nodes as traffic senders, and egress nodes as traffic re-
ceivers. Furthermore, the traffic can be adapted by using
switching protocols such as CR-LDP [6] and RSVP-TE [4].
An ingress node is responsible to manage the traffic in the
multiple paths to the egress nodes so that traffic congestion
and overhead are minimized.
As shown in Fig. 2, Label Switch Paths (LSPs) from the
ingress node to the egress node are provisioned before the
actual packet transmissions occur. Then, once the transmis-
sions start, the ingress node will estimate the congestion that
might occur in one or more of the k edge disjoint paths. As
stated in [7], the congestion measure is related to one of the
following factors: delay, loss rate, and bandwidth. In general,
each ingress node in the network will route the incoming
packets into the k disjoint paths. One of these paths will carry
the encoded packets, and all other k− 1 paths will carry plain
packets. Each packet has its own routing number, so that the
egress node will be able to manage the order of the incoming
packet, and thus achieve the decoding operations.
MATE works in two phases [7]: a monitoring phase and
a load balancing phase. These two phases will monitor the
traffic and balance packets among all disjoint paths. One good
feature of MATE is that its load balancing algorithms equalize
the derivative of delay among all edge disjoint paths from an
ingress node to an egress node. Furthermore, MATE’s load
balancing preserves packet ordering since load balancing is
done at the flow level (which is identified by a 5-tuple IP
address) rather than at the packet level.
IV. S-MATE SCHEME
In this section, we provide a scheme for securing MATE,
called S-MATE (Secure Multipath Adaptive Traffic Engi-
neering). The basic idea of S-MATE can be described as
shown in Equation (4). S-MATE inherits the traffic engineering
components described in the previous section and in [7], [8].
Without loss of generality, assume that the network traffic
between a pair of ingress and egress nodes is transmitted in
rounds from ingress to egress nodes . . .
1 2 3 . . . . . . n . . .
L1lh y
1 P 11 P 12 . . . . . . P 1(n−1) . . .
L2lh P
21 y2 P 22 . . . . . . P 2(n−1) . . .
L3lh P
31 P 32 y3 . . . . . . P 3(n−1) . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
L
j
lh P
j1 P j2 . . . yj . . . P j(n−1) . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
Lklh P
k1 P k2 . . . . . . P k(k−1) yn . . .
(4)
k edge disjoint paths, each of which carries different packets.
For simplicity, we assume that the number of edge disjoint
paths and the number of rounds in one transmission session
are equal. There are two types of packets:
i) Plain Packets: These are packets P ij sent without
coding, in which the ingress node does not need to
perform any coding operations. For example, in the case
of packets sent without coding, the ingress node Nl sends
the following packet to the egress node Nh:
packetNl→Nh(IDNl , x
ij , t
j
δ), for i = 1, 2, .., k, i 6= j. (5)
The plain data xij are actually the encryption of the
message mij obtained by using any secure symmetric en-
cryption algorithm [15]. That is, xij = Encyptkeyi(mij),
where keyi is a symmetric key shared between Nl and
Nh.
ii) Encoded Packets: These are packets yi sent with en-
coded data, in which the ingress node Nl sends other
incoming data. In this case, the ingress node Nl sends
the following packet to egress node Nh:
packetNl→Nh(IDNl ,
j−1∑
i=1
xi j−1 +
k∑
i=j+1
xij , t
j
δ). (6)
The encoded packet will be used in case any of the
working paths is compromised. The egress node will be
able to detect the compromised data, and can recover them
by using the data sent in the protection path.
Lemma 2: The S-MATE scheme is optimal against a single
link attack.
What we mean by optimal is that the encoding and decoding
operations are achieved over the binary field with the least
computational overhead. That is, one cannot find a better
scheme than this proposed encoding scheme in terms of
encoding operations. Indeed, one single protection path is used
in case of a single attack path or failure. The transmission is
done in rounds (time slots), and hence linear combinations
of data have to be from the same round time. This can be
achieved by using the time slot that is included in each packet
sent by the ingress node.
Lemma 3: The network capacity between the ingress node
and the egress node is given by k−1 in the case of one single
attack path.
4node node
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Fig. 3. Working and protection edge disjoint paths between two core nodes.
The protection path carries encoded packets from all other working paths
between ingress and egress nodes.
Encoding Process: There are several scenarios where the
encoding operations can be achieved. The encoding and decod-
ing operations will depend mainly on the network topology;
i.e., on how the senders and receivers are distributed in the
network.
• The encoding operation is performed at only one ingress
node Nl. In this case, Nl will prepare and send the
encoded data over Lilh to the receiver Nh.
• We assume that k packets will be sent in every transmis-
sion session from the ingress node. Also, if the number of
incoming packets is greater than k, then a mod function
is used to moderate the outgoing traffic in k different
packets. Every packet will be sent in a different path.
• Incoming packets with large sizes will be divided into
small chunks, each with an equal size.
Decoding Process: The decoding process is performed in a
similar way as explained in the previous works [2], [3].
We assume that the ingress node Nl assigns the paths
that will carry plain data as shown in Fig. 3. In addition,
Nl will encode the data from all incoming traffics and send
them in one path. This will be used to protect any single
link attacks/failures. The objective is to withhold rerouting
signals or transmitted packets due to link attacks. However,
we provide strategies that use network coding and reduced
capacity at the ingress nodes. We assume that the source
nodes (ingress) are able to perform encoding operations and
the receiver nodes (egress) are able to perform decoding
operations.
One of S-MATE’s objectives is to minimize the delay of the
transmitted packets. So, the packets from one IP address will
be received in order on one path. The key features of S-MATE
can be described as follows:
• The traffic from the ingress node to the egress node is
secured against eavesdroppers and intruders.
• No extra paths in addition to the existing network edge
disjoint paths are needed to secure the network traffic.
• It can be implemented without adding new hardware or
network components.
The following example illustrates the plain and encoded data
transmitted from five senders to five receivers.
Example 4: Let Nl and Nh be two core network nodes
(sender and receiver) in a cloud network. Equation (7) explains
the plain and encoded data sent in five consecutive time slots
from the sender to the receiver. In the first time slot, the first
connection carries encoded data, and all other connections
carry plain data. Furthermore, the encoded data are distributed
among all connections in the time slots 2, 3, 4 and 5.
cycle 1 2 3
rounds 1 2 3 4 5 . . . . . .
L1lh y
1 x11 x12 x13 x14 . . . . . .
L2lh x
21 y2 x22 x23 x24 . . . . . .
L3lh x
31 x32 y3 x33 x34 . . . . . .
L4lh x
41 x42 x43 y4 x44 . . . . . .
L5lh x
51 x52 x53 x54 y5 . . . . . .
(7)
The encoded data yj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ 5, are sent as
yj =
j−1∑
i=1
xi j−1 +
5∑
i=j+1
xij . (8)
We notice that every message has its own time slot. Hence,
the protection data are distributed among all paths for fairness.
V. A STRATEGY AGAINST TWO ATTACKED PATHS
In this section, we propose a strategy against two attacked
paths (links), securing MATE against two-path attacks. The
strategy is achieved using network coding and dedicated paths.
Assume we have n connections carrying data from an ingress
node to an egress node. All connections represent disjoint
paths.
We will provide two backup paths to secure against any two
disjoint paths, which might experience any sort of attacks.
These two protection paths can be chosen using network
provisioning. The protection paths are fixed for all rounds per
session from the ingress node to the egress node, but they
may vary among sessions. For example, the ingress node Nl
transmits a message xiℓ to the egress node Nh through path
Liℓh at time tℓδ in round time ℓ in session δ. This process is
explained in Equation (9) as:
cycle 1 . . .
1 2 3 . . . n . . .
L1lh x
11 x12 x13 . . . x1n . . .
L2lh x
21 x22 x23 . . . x2n . . .
L3lh x
31 x32 x33 . . . x3n . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
Lilh x
i1 xi2 xi3 . . . xin . . .
L
j
lh y
j1 yj2 yj3 . . . yjn . . .
Lklh y
k1 yk2 yk3 . . . ykn . . .
Li+1lh x
(i+1)1 x(i+1)2 x(i+1)3 . . . x(i+1)n . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
Lnlh x
n1 xn2 xn3 . . . xnn . . .
(9)
5All yℓj’s are defined as:
yjℓ =
n∑
i=1,i6=j 6=k
aℓix
iℓ and ykℓ =
n∑
i=1,i6=k 6=j
bℓix
iℓ. (10)
The coefficients aℓi and bℓi are chosen over a finite field Fq
with q > n− 2, see [3] for more details. One way to choose
these coefficients is by using the follow two vectors.[
1 1 1 . . . 1
1 α α2 . . . αn−3
]
(11)
Therefore, the coded data is
yjℓ =
n∑
i=1,i6=j 6=k
xiℓ and ykℓ =
n∑
i=1,i6=k 6=j
αi mod n−2xiℓ. (12)
In the case of two failures, the receivers will be able to solve
two linearly independent equations in two unknown variables.
For instance, assume the two failures occur in paths number
two and four. Then the receivers will be able to construct two
equations with coefficients[
1 1
α α3
]
(13)
Therefore, we have
x2ℓ + x4ℓ (14)
αx2ℓ + α3x4ℓ (15)
One can multiply the first equation by α and subtract the two
equations to obtain value of x4ℓ.
We notice that the encoded data symbols yjℓ and ykℓ are
fixed per one session but it is varied for other sessions. This
means that the path Ljlh is dedicated to send all encoded data
yj1, yj2, . . . , yjn.
Lemma 5: The network capacity of the protection strategy
against two-path attacks is given by n− 2.
There are three different scenarios for two-path attacks,
which can be described as follows:
i) If the two-path attacks occur in the backup protection
paths Ljlh and Lklh, then no recovery operations are
required at the egress node.
ii) If the two-path attacks occur in one backup protection
path say Ljlh and one working path Lilh, then recovery
operations are required.
iii) If the two-path attacks occur in two working paths, then
in this case the two protection paths are used to recover
the lost data. The idea of recovery in this case is to build
a system of two linearly independent equations with two
unknown variables.
VI. NETWORK PROTECTION USING DISTRIBUTED
CAPACITIES AND QOS
In this section, we develop a network protection strategy
in which some connection paths have high priorities (less
bandwidth and high demand). Let k be the set of available
connections (disjoint paths from ingress to egress nodes). Let
m be the set of rounds in every cycle. We assume that all
round time cycle 1
1 2 3 4 . . . m− 1 m
L1ℓh y
11 x11 x12 y12 . . . y1p1 x1d1
L2ℓh x
21 y21 x22 x23 . . . x2d2 y2p2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Liℓh y
i1 xi1 xi2 yi2 . . . yipi xidi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
L
j
ℓh x
j1 xj2 yj1 xj3 . . . xjdj yjpj
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Lkℓh x
k1 yk1 xk2 xk4 . . . ykpk xkdk
(17)
connection paths might not have the same priority demands
and working capacities. Connections that carry applications
with multimedia traffic have higher priorities than those of
applications carrying data traffic.. Therefore, it is required to
design network protection strategies based on the traffic and
sender priorities.
Consider that available working connections k may use their
bandwidth assignments in asymmetric ways. Some connec-
tions are less demanding in terms of bandwidth requirements
than other connections that require full capacity frequently.
Therefore, connections with less demand can transmit more
protection packets, while other connections demand more
bandwidth, and can therefore transmit fewer protection packets
throughout the transmission rounds. Let m be the number
of rounds and tδi be the time of transmission in a cycle δ
at round i. For a particular cycle i, let t be the number of
protection paths against t link failures or attacks that might
affect the working paths. We will design a network protection
strategy against t arbitrary link failures as follows. Let the
source sj send di data packets and pi protection packets such
that dj + pj = m. Put differently:
k∑
i=1
(di + pi) = km. (16)
In general, we do not assume that di = dj and pi = pj .
The encoded data yiℓ are given by
yiℓ =
∑
k=1,ykℓ 6=ykℓ
xkℓ. (18)
We assume that the maximum number of attacks/failures
that might occur in a particular cycle is t. Hence, the number
of protection paths (paths that carry encoded data) is t. The
selection of the working and protection paths in every round
is performed by using a demand-based priority function at
the senders’s side. It will also depend on the traffic type and
service provided on these protection and working connections.
See Fig. 4 for ingress and egress nodes with five disjoint
connections.
In Equation (17), every connection i is used to carry
di unencoded data xi1, xi2, . . . , xidi (working paths) and pi
6Fig. 4. Working and protection edge disjoint paths between two core nodes
(ingress and egress nodes). Every path Li carries encoded and plain packets
depending on the traffic priority pi and time ti.
encoded data yi1, yi2, . . . , yipi (protection paths) such that
di + pi = m.
Lemma 6: Let t be the number of connection paths carry-
ing encoded data in every round. Then, the network capacity
CN is given by
CN = k − t. (19)
Proof: The proof is straightforward from the fact that t
protection paths exist in every round, and hence k− t working
paths are available throughout all m rounds.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed the S-MATE scheme
(secure multipath adaptive traffic engineering) for operational
networks. We have used network coding of transmitted packets
to protect the traffic between two core nodes (routers, switches,
etc.) that could exist in a cloud network. Our assumption is
based on the fact that core network nodes share multiple edge
disjoint paths from the sender to the receiver. S-MATE can
secure network traffic against single link attacks/failures by
adding redundancy in one of the operational paths. Further-
more, the proposed scheme can be built to secure operational
networks including optical and multipath adaptive networks.
In addition, it can provide security services at the IP and data
link layers.
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